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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




THE PUBLIC SERVICE COl\IMISSION OF 11081 
UTAH; HALF. BENNETT, DONALD HACK 
ING; and DONALD T. ADAMS, its ;nembers; 
and WYCOFF COMPANY, INCORPORATED, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
LINK TRUCKING, INC .. UINTAH FREIGHT-
W A YS, a corporation, MILNE TRUCK LINES, 
INC., PALMER BROTHERS, INCORPORATED, 
RIO GRANDE MOTOR WAY, INC., LAKE 
SHORE MOTOR COACH LINES, INC., DEN-
VER-SALT LAKE-PACIFIC STAGES, INC., 
and CONTINENTAL BUS SYSTEM, INC., 
Plaintiffs, Case No. 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UT AH, 
DONALD HACKING, DON T. ADAMS and 
HALS. BENNETT, Commissioners of the Pub-




BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
REHEARING AND RECONSIDERATION 
BY 'VYCOFF COMPANY, INCORPORATED 
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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing or reconsideration 
of the decision which was issued under date of March 
24, 1969, whereby the majority of the court directed 
that the Certificate issued in 1967 by the Commission 
to the applicant be set aside and that the entire matter 
be held by the Public Service Commission until the 
transcript of the record is complete, has been reviewed 
by the Commission and then returned to this court. The 
case was an application by \Vycoff Company for an 
extension of its express authority and was heard before 
an Examiner duly appointed by the Commission without 
any objection from any of the parties protestant and 
the hearings were completed on September 9, 1969. 
The applicant and protestants submitted briefs to the 
Examiner and then to the Commission and argued 
their matters, and the Commission then received the 
Report, Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Recom-
mended Order from the Examiner on May 10, 1967, 
and then after hearing arguments and consideration 
of the briefs of the parties and the report of the Exami-
ner, adopted such as its own and issued its report and 
recommended order on September 12, 1967. 
DISPOSITION BY THE UTAH PUBLIC 
SERVICE COMMISSION 
As indicated above in the Statement, the Commis-
sion appointed a hearing examiner, Mr. Lorin F. Broad-
6 
bent, prior to the time of the commencement of this 
case and assigned him to hear the evidence on this 
matter, which he did, and made of course notes thereon 
and heard the argument of counsel as well as having 
seen the witnesses themselves, received memoranda 
from counsel for all parties, and then submitted and 
filed his findings of fact, conclusions and recommend-
ed order to the Commission. Thereafter the Commis-
sioners reviewed memoranda from the parties, argu-
ment from the parties and made and filed its report 
and order, favorable to the applicant, which report and 
order consist of 21 pages, showing that a very thorough 
consideration had been given to all of the vital elements, 
namely: the needs of the shipping public, the rights 
and responsibilities of the various carriers involved, 
the protection of necessary service, and a determination 
was made by the Commission that an extension of the 
express rights should be granted. 
No objection was made at any stage of the pro-
ceedings by any of the protestants to the use of an 
examiner or to the determination so made by the Com-
mission until well after the final decision had been made. 
Petitions for rehearing and reconsideration were filed 
by each of the appealing protestants, and in the grounds 
for rehearing or reconsideration none set forth an objec-
tion to: 
(a) The use of an examiner for the hearing 
of the evidence; 
( b) The right of the Commission to act in 
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response to the recommended report of the exami-
ner and the memoranda and arguments submitted 
by the various parties prior to its consideration and 
decision; and 
( c) The absence of a transcript of the testi-
mony before the Commission at the time of the 
hearing and determination of the recommended 
report of the examiner. 
The record before the Commission also shows that 
on May 10, 1967, after the report and order of the 
Examiner had been filed and made available to all 
parties, the Commission issued its "Notice and Order 
Fixing Time on Filing Exceptions'', granting to each 
and all parties 30 days from date of service within which 
to file exceptions respecting the statements of fact, 
conclusions of law, and designating that the Commis-
sion may hereafter fix an appropriate time and place for 
oral argument upon the exceptions, if there be any; 
and then stating: 
"The Order herein shall not become an effec-
tive order as the order of the Commission until the 
final order of the Commission issues." 
Then such final order was issued on September 12. 
1967, consisting of some 21 pages, showing full and 
thorough consideration. 
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STATEMENT O.F .FACTS 
\Ve shall not attempt to repeat the facts as set fortli 
in the briefs, but only as relevant to reconsideration of 
this particular matter raised by the court as a result 
of the failure of the protestants to provide to the Com-
mission a transcript of the testimony so that the same 
could be certified to this court for its consideration on 
tlie appeal. To this end, we believe that a chronolgy of 
the case may be helpful: 
1964 - Application for extension of authority 
filed by Wycoff. 
Nov. 8, 1965 - Conference held before the 
Commission on initial hearing date following notice 
given by mail and publication and, after discus-
sion, the Commission advised all parties and orderd 
that the actual hearings would be before the Com-
missioner's examiner, Lorin J. Broadbent, and 
would commence at a date upon which notice 
would be given. No objections were made by any 
of the protestants to such proceeding. 
Jan. 10, 1966 - Hearings commenced before 
Examiner Lorin J. Broadbent, and were held at 
Salt Lake City, Logan, Vernal, Moab, Richfield, 
and Cedar City. 
September 9, 1966 - Hearings completed. 
November, 1966 - Applicant and the protest-
ants prepared and submitted briefs to the Exami-
ner and the Commission in support of their respec-
tive positions. 
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May 10, 1967 - Examiner's report and order 
issued and served on all parties ( 18 pages). 
May 10, 1967 - 30 days time fixed for fili1w ' 0 
exceptions. (Note that all parties had heretofore 
briefed the matter for the Examiner and the Com-
mission). 
July 10, 1967 - Case submitted to the Com-
mission for review of the decision of the Examiner 
and the briefs, memoranda and exceptions of the 
various parties. 
September 12, 1967 - Report and order of the 
Commission issuing Certificate Nos. 1608 and 1609, 
wherein all of the operating authority of Wycoff 
Company was considered and the new authority 
recommended and issued in a Certificate authoriz-
ing express service on a statewide basis of ship-
ments not to exceed 250 pounds for any shipper , 
on any day. 
October, 1967 - Petitions for rehearing and 
reconsideration were timely filed by the protestants. 
October 18, 1967 - Order denying petitions 
for rehearing and reconsideration issued. 
November, 1967 - Petitions for writ of cer· 
tiorari filed and writs issued directing the Com· 
mission to ceritfy the record to this court within 
30 days. 
March 13, 1968 Motions of Lewis Brothers ~ 
10 
Stages, et al. for extensions of time within which 
the Conunission is required to certify and file the 
record. 
April 1, 1968 - Hearing of motion for exten-
sion of time for filing the record (this is the first 
time anyone heard a suggestion that the case be 
considered by your court on the basis of the files, 
exhibits, memoranda and briefs of the parties with-
out a transcript of the testimony). 
April 10, 1968 - Order of the Court that the 
case be presented for review to this Court on the 
findings and report of the Examiner and upon the 
memoranda of the respective parties "in lieu of the 
transcript of the evidence." 
July and August, 1968 - Briefs of parties filed. 
October, 1968 - Case argued before the Su-
preme Court, based upon the record prescribed by 
the court. 
March 24, 1969 - Decision. 
One further material fact should be considered by 
the Court, and that is the established practice that the 
party taking an appeal from an order of the Commis-
sion procure, at its expense, from the reporter a tran-
script of the testimony and supply it to the Commission 
for certification within a 30 day period. Due to the 
numerous witnesses involved, the extensive period of 
time encompassed in the hearing and the unusually 
busy schedule of Mr. Clair Johnson, the court reporter 
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serving the Commission, the appealing protestant motur 
carriers were unable to procure from him a transcript 
of the testimony within the time required by the original 
order of the \V rit of Review or within the extended 
time allowed by the court. He has not even yet pre-
pared such a transcript. \Vhether l\'Ir. Johnson would 
have prepared such a transcript had the appellants 
ordered more than one copy does not appear from the 
record, but the facts are absolutely without contradic-
ton that \:V ycoff Company had no duty to procure and 
furnish such transcript of the testimony to the Com-
mission, and has done nothing to prejudice the rights 
of the appealing parties, and did not make any objection 
to an extension of time by this court for the supplying 
of such record until in l\'Iarch of 1968, when the appel· ' 
lant motor carriers represented to this court that it 
would be "at least one year for him to complete the 
transcript'', which seemed an extraordinarily long time 
following the issuance of the report and order in Sep-
tember of 1967. 
The decision places in doubt the right of the Com· 
mission to utilize an examiner, notwithstanding the 
provisions of the statute making such appropriate and 
seems to infer that all of the Commissioners must be 
present at every hearing. This would stifle its capa-
bility of conducting the manifold responsibilites imposed 
upon it by the Utah Legislature, as the Commissioners 
also act as the Securities Commission, the Department 
of Business Regulation, etc. A new procedure woul<l , 
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Sf'Clll to be imposed by this Decision whereby it is 
neces~ary that, if au examiner is used, a transcript of 
the testimony be prepared in every case before submis-
sion to the Commissioners, and requiring them to dupli-
cate the efforts of the examiner by rereading the tra11-
snipt of the testimony before they can receive, accept, 
adopt and file the report of the examiner. 
ARGUMENT ON PETITION 
POINT I 
APPELLANT-liROTESTAN'l'S HA\'E NO'l' 
COMPLIED 'i\TITH SECTION 54-7-17 U.C.A. 
1953 FOR A STAY AND THE COURT .MAY 
NOT 'V AI\'E PROOF OF GREAT AND IR-
REP ARAllLE DA.MAGE AND POSTING OF 
BOND. 
The Legislature of Utah made provisions for a 
stay of an order of the Commission pending review 
by this court. That is set forth in Section 54-7-17, 
U.C.A. 1953, and the conditions and procedure are 
detailed as guidance for the court and for all parties 
who are interested in such a matter. 'Ve submit that 
because the Legislature has acted upon stays, that the 
procedure as outlined must be followed by this Court 
and by all concerned. Subsection 1 of that statute 
provi<les that the pendency of a writ of review shall 
not itself stay or suspend the operation of the order 
or decision of the Commission, and then grants to the 
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Court, in its discretion, the right to stay or suspend, 
in whole or in part, the operation of the Commissiou's 
order or decision. Subparagraph 2 is very specific that 
"no order so staying or suspending an order or deci-
sion of the Commission shall be made by the Supreme 
Court otherwise than upon three days notice and after 
hearing and the order suspending the same shall con-
tain a specific finding based upon evidence submitted 
to the court and identified by reference thereto, that 
great or irreparable damage would otherwise result 
to the petitioner, and specifying the nature of the dam-
age. Here we have no petitioner requesting such 
relief and we have no allegations upon which a showing 
of great and irreparable damage could be predicated, 
and nothing of that nature has been mentioned in the 
decision of March 24, 1969 issued by this court. 
Subparagraph 3 of that statute states that the order 
of the court staying a decision of the Commission shall 
not become effective until a suspending bond shall "first 
have been executed and filed with and approved by ' 
the Commission, (or approved upon review by the Su· 
preme Court) payable to the State of Utah and suffi-
cient in amount and security to insure the prompt pay· 
ment by the party petitioning for the review of all 
damages caused by the delay in the enforcement of the 
order or decision of the Commission . . . " 
As applied to our present circumstance, the public 
and 'Vycoff Company have come to rely upon the deci· 
sion of the Commission and the certificate issued by it 1 
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in September of 19G7, and the service so authorized lias 
Leen carrie<l forward continuously since that time. 
liefore any order of suspension or stay of the eifectiv.:-
uess of the said eertificate issued by the Commission 
is had, a very substantial bond should be posted by 
the appealing motor carriers. No showing of any great 
or irreparable harm has been identified by the appellant-
protestant motor carriers upon which the "specific find-
ing" referred to in lhe statute could be based, and we 
submit that 110 such a great or irreparable damage or 
harm could be shown by any of the motor carriers, par-
ticularly at this late date after the 'Vrit of Review 
has been outstanding for over a year. \Ve feel certain 
that the appellant-protestants in this proceeding did 
uot ask for a stay because they recognized the responsi-
bility 'vihch would adhere to them, had they posted a 
bond and sought the relief which has been gratuitiously 
extended to them by the order of the court. A careful 
review of the various petitions for writ of certiorari and 
review show that each protestant-appellant has sought 
merely for a review of the proceedings and a reversal 
of the order of the Commission. 
POINT II 
THE USE 01'~ AN EXAJ\UNER FOR THE 




THE RIGHT OF THE COM~IISSION TO 
ACT IN RESPONSE TO THE RECOlVIMEND-
ED REPORT OF THE EXAMINER AND THE 
MEMORANDA AND ARGUMENTS SUBMIT-
TED BY THE VARIOUS PARTIES PRIOR 
TO ITS CONSIDERATION AND DECISION 
SHOULD BE CLARIFIED NOW. 
Since the formation of the Commission it has Leen 
empowered to transact business and given quite a wide 
latitude in its performance of such regulatory powers 
over the public utilities of the State of Utah. In Section 
54-1-3, U.C.A. 1953, it provides that "any investiga-
tion, inquiry or hearing which the Commission has 
power to undertake or to hold may be undertaken or 
held "by or before any commissioner or an examiner 
appointed by the Commission. All investigations, in-
quiries and hearings by a commissioner or an examiner 
appointed by the Commission shall be deemed to be 
the investigations, inquiries and hearings of the Com-
mission; and all findings, orders or decisions made by 
a commissioner or an examiner appointed by the Com- , 
mission, when approved and confirmed by the Commis-
sion and filed in its off ice, shall be deemed the findings, 
orders or decisions of the Commission, shall have the 
same effect as if originally made by the Commission." 
In reviewing the legislative history of this, we note 
that the section as quoted above came into being in that 
form by the Laws of Utah 1951, Chapter 88, when sec- 1 
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tion 76-1-4 of the Utah Code Annotated 1943 was 
amended, so as to empower the Commission to utilize 
an examiner. The prior statute had authorized the hold-
ing of investigations, inquiries and hearings by a single 
commissioner, and that the findings, orders and decisions 
of such single commissioner, when approved and con-
firmed by the Commission and filed in its off ice, should 
be the act of the Commission as a whole. In the 1951 
Session Laws, the provision for an examiner was added 
along with the single commissioner, so that as the statute 
now reads it is possible for a single commissioner or a 
single examiner to conduct the hearings; and by f al-
lowing the procedure thus stated the findings, orders 
or decisions made by the commissioner or the examiner 
"when approved and confirmed by Commission and 
filed in its office, shall be deemed the findings, orders 
or decision of the Commission, and shall have the same 
effect as if originally made by the Commission." 
It would seem apparent that at this point that the 
decision of the court issued in this case has cast doubt 
upon the legality of all proceedings had by the Com-
mission during the past years where only one Com-
missioner has sat in at the hearing, which has generally 
been the pattern before the appointment of an examiner 
in 1967, and that all of the decisions made by the ex-
aminer since 1967 and approved by the Commission 
are likewise questionable. 
The right of a single commissioner to act on behalf 
of the Commission at the taking of evidence is now on 
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the same level and the same basis as the right oi' the 1 
examiner, and vice versa, as a result of the 1951 amend-
ment of the statute. \Ve believe that the Conmussio11 
would be hard-pressed to show any motor carrier case 
in which the hearings through the years by a single 
commissioner or by an examiner have been followed 
by a transcript of the testimony and submitted to tile 
Commission before it made its determination as a >d10le. , 
Customarily the orders of the Commission bear the 
names of all or at least two of the Conunissiouers 
though in only rare occasions have all of the commis-
sioners sat. At the inception of this present 'Vycoff 
case in 1966, all of the commissioners were present when 
the decision was made to utilize an examiner, and uu 
objection was made by any of the protestants to this. 
as all recognized that this would be a long case, imoh-
ing a number of witnesses, and the Commissioners them· 
selves did not have the time to deYote to a case so exten· 
sive as they have a host of other duties and responsi· 
bilities which they must perform. 
The utilizatio11 of an examiner for the taking of 
evidence and the submission of a proposed report au<l • 
order is not a unique, new practice which has been 
dreamed up by the State of Utah without ample con· 
sideration. The general pattern of the Interstate Com· 
merce Commission since the time of its formation in 
the supenision of motor carriers in 1935 has been th:d 
an examiner is designated by the commission to trawl 
to the various states and localities where the hearing1 
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are being held to take the evidence, consider the exhibits 
and then make a recommended report and order to 
the Commission. Then each party has a right to file 
exceptions (just as the Commission prescribed in this 
particular case) and then the decision is made by the 
Commission as to the final order. 
The Public Service Commission of Utah has pat-
terned its activities in this case to follow the established 
and court-approved procedure of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, having in mind the element of fair-
ness and the opportunity for all to present their posi-
tions through exceptions to the examiner's report. Be-
fore the Interstate Commerce Commission, a party may 
purchase a copy of the transcript it desires or it may 
prepare exceptions based upon its own notes and records 
of the case. So too, in our present case the commission 
designated an examiner to hear the testimony. The 
hearings were completed in the various parts of the 
state by September 9, 1966, and the report and recom-
mended order of the examiner was not issued until 
May 10 of 1967. During that period of over one-half 
a year, had the appellant-protestants so desired, they 
could have procured a transcript of the testimony then, 
before l\lr. Johnson became so busy with some major 
utility work at a later date. 
During that period of time all of the protestants, 
as well as the applicant, submitted to the examiner 
memoranda in support of their respective positions, out-
lining the impact, if any, which the grant of the appli-
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cation might haYe, the needs and requirements of the 
shippers and the service being performed and available 
to the public. None of these appellant-protestants 
elected to purchase a transcript of the testimony at that 
time, and none has done so to this date, though we 
recognize that such is probably not their fault, though 
they delayed until well after the decision by the Com-
mission before ordering such a transcript. 
The passage of time in this case, as well as the 
magnitude of the case, is greater than any which the 
Commission has ever had on motor carriers before iu 
its history, and by the same token greater care, concern 
and consideration were given to this case than any other 
case which has been handled by the Commission in past 
years. The thoroughness of the report and recommended 
order of the examiner issued on May 10, 1967 is sig-
nificant, and in addition to that the even greater 
thoroughness and completenes of the report and order 
of the Commission issued September 12, 1967 is im-
pressive in its evaluation of all of the elements necessary 
for a valid order, the impact upon the other carriers 
and the granting of a lesser authority than applied for 
by the applicant. It is to be noted that Section 541-o-5 
relating to the granting of certificates of convenience 
and necessity by the Commission reads in part: 
"If the Commission finds from the evidence 
that the public convenience and necessity require 
the proposed service, or any part thereof, it may 
issue a ceritficate as prayed for, or issue it for the 
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partial ctl::ercise only of the privilege sought, and 
may attach to the exercise of the right granted by 
such certificate such terms and conditions as in its 
judgment the public convenience and necessity 
may require, otherwise such certificates shall be 
denied." (Emphasis ours). 
Certainly the mandate of this section has been fully 
realized, as a lesser amount of authority was granted 
than prayed, and key restrictions were imposed in the 
wisdom of the Commission. 
This Court has erred in its interim order setting 
aside the decision of the Commission and its Certificate 
on a partial record, and in the face of testimony of over 
200 public shipper witnesses. The Court, while declar-
ing that it could not decide the case because of lack 
of a transcript, has nevertheless substituted its judg-
ment for that of the examiner and of the Commission. 
No vacating and setting aside of the certificate should 
be granted as the protestant-appellants have had full 
protection of their positions by the examiner and the 
Commission. 
POINT IV 
THIS DECISION AND SETTING ASIDE 
BY THE COURT IS CONTRARY TO THE 
PROYISIONS OF SECTION 5~-7-10, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 'VHICH PRO-
YIDES THAT ORDERS OF THE COMMIS-
21 
SION OF THEIR O\\TN FORCE SHALL 
"TAKE EFFECT AND BECOME OPERATIYE 
TWENTY DAYS AFTER THE SERVICE 
THEREOF." 
The Legislature m the enactment of the public 
utility laws, and particularly those relating to motor 
carriers, felt that once the Commission had entered 
its Report and Order that such should become effective 
unless the steps prescribed by statute for the posting 
of a bond and procuring a stay of the effective date 
were folowed by the appellant-protestants. To this 
end, in Section 54-7-10 U.C.A. 1953, it was provided 
that after conclusion of the hearing the Commission 
shall make and file its order containing its decision. Then 
a requirement that a copy of such order, certified under 
the seal of the Commission, shall be served upon the 
corporation, the persons complained of or its attorney. 
And then it reads: 
"Said order shall of its own force take effect 
and become operative 20 days after the service 
thereof, except as otherwise provided in such order, 
and shall continue in force either for a period which 
may be designated then or until changed or abro· 
gated by the Commission." 
The Commission's order in this proceeding in issuing 
Certificate No. 1068 to 'Vycoff Company, Incorporatea 
imposed no restriction for the effective date and imposed 
no limitation as to the time and service, but rather 
directed specifically that the "applicant shall render 
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reasonable, adequate and continuous service in pursu-
ance of the authority herein granted, and failure to 
<lo so shall constitute sufficient grounds for termination 
and suspension of the said certificate." 
As directed by said order, the applicant did file its 
necessary tariffs and proceed with the rendition of 
service, and has been doing so continuously ever smce 
the date of said order in September of 1967. 
As we read the statutes, the said order becomes 
effective and continues in force as prescribed by Section 
.54-7 -10 unless and until there has been a reversal of the 
order by this Commission after a full hearing of the 
matter, or there has been a stay granted under the bond 
and other procedures set forth in Section 54-7 -17. No 
one will contend that there has been a full hearing on 
review of this case, because the decision of this court 
makes it very clear that such has not been done, and 
could not be done without a transcript of the testimony 
being made available to this court. And who has the 
duty to provide such a transcript for the Commission 
to be certified to this court? This duty is imposed by 
custom and practice on the appellant-protestants, and 
mch duty was known to them at the time of the com-
mencement of this case, at the time of the preparation 
and the submission of memoranda to the examiner 
dming the better than one-half year that he had the 
matter under advisement and consideration, and at all 
times thereafter. 
'Ve do not have the problem of a small motor 
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carrier taking an appeal and being unable to afford the 
necessary funds to pay a court reporter to transcribe 
the testimony, but rather here we have the combined 
financial resources of the major bus lines, the major 
truck lines of this whole state of Utah, which could be 
marshalled to pay the court reporter for the transcribing 
of the testimony which was completed back in Sep-
tember of 1966. Certainly their knowledge of the fact 
that Mr. Johnson was busy did not foreclose the duty 
which they had to the Commission to supply a tran· 
script, even if it meant hiring a skilled stenographer 
to transcribe from the tape of the record which l\Ir. 
Johnson took of the entire proceedings, the words which 
were spoken by all parties, the examiner and the parti· 
cipants in the proceedings. No hardship can be claimed 
by them except that they have failed to place sufficient 
financial inducements before either Mr. Johnson or 
some stenographer to make the transcription so as to 
have it available for the court so that a complete review 
of the matter could be had. 
We would urge that if a prejudice is to be suffered 
in this proceeding, that it should not be imposed upon 
Wycoff Company and the public as a result of this 
failure, but that the appellant-protestants should suffer 
part of the responsibility and prejudice, if any does 
arise. At no time have we ever contended before this 
court that a full and complete review of the case should 
be had without a transcript of the testimony. 'Ve know 
as do all other parties, that such has been the custom 
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and the practice, and that it is the duty of the appellant 
to provide it for the court so that the court can be fully 
advised of the scope of the evidence, the needs of the 
shipper witnesses, the availability of the protestants' 
service, etc. But the failure to provide such should not 
result in a dismissal of the action of the Commission 
through a suspension and setting aside of the Order 
which it has granted, but rather should be placed in 
proper perspective and result only in a continuation of 
the hearing of the case by the Supreme Court until 
and when such a transcript has been purchased and 
supplied to the Commission for certification to this court 
so the appeal can be completed. 
It was not until the hearing of a .Motion before 
this court on April 1, 1968 that the parties had ever 
considered the possibility of this case being heard by 
the Court without a transcript of the testimony. It is 
our recollection that such was at the suggestion of 
members of the Court as a possible alternate, and only 
then did any objection come forward from the protest-
ants to that plan. Aside from this being a new and 
different procedure, we feel certain that the Court had 
hoped that the parties might agree upon the Statement 
of Facts as set forth in their briefs. Without claiming 
any special virtue for the Appendix of the testimony 
of the supporting shippers, consisting of some 78 pages 
attached to the brief of the defendant Wycoff Com-
pany, and the complete absence of any such summary 
of the testimony of the shipper witnesses by any other 
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party to the proceeding, we at least must assert th, 
at this point it is before the court and that there m 
and is substantial proof of the fact that there w0 
extensive public shipper testimony to support each an1 
every segment of the order of the Commission in th1, 
proceeding. The fact that the protestant motor carrier, 
who had the duty to supply the transcript for this court 
have failed to stipulate or agree to those facts (and 11r 
never required them to do so), does not mean that llF 
Commission was without any jurisdiction or basis ir 
its review of the 18 page Report and Order of th 
examiner, review of the memoranda submitted by tn1 
parties and following the recommended report of \ll, 
examiner while the matters were very fresh in lni 
minds of all parties. The issuance of its report an1; 
order and the certificate as has been done in this pr(1 
ceeding was in conformance with its stautory dufo 
POINT V 
THIS DECISION AND SETTING ASIDE 
BY THE COURT REVERSES THE STATl" 
TORY MANDATE OF SECTION 54-7-10. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, STATING 
THAT THE "l~INDINGS AND CONCLUSIO~~ 
OF THE CO.MMISSION ON QUESTIONS Of e: 
FACT SHALL BE l?IN AL AND SHALL NO'l rr 
BE SUBJECT TO REVIEW." n 
TV ff l ... I 18 u. (2d) 255, 4~1 C( Lewis v. yco o., nc., 
P. 2d 264. 
Ol 
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"It is not our prerogative to pass upon the wis-
dom of the Commission's decision. It is charged 
with the responsibility of general supervision 
awl regulation of the common carriers of this 
state and of seeing that the public receives the 
most efficient and econornical service possible. 
This requires consideration not only of the im-
mediate advantage that may inure to some mem-
bers of the public and/or to the applying carrier, 
but also of the long-range needs of safeguarding 
the economic stability and continuity of existing 
services. The power with which the Commission 
is invested to perform this duty is, of course, not 
arbitrary. It must be exercised with reason and 
within the scope of the authority given it by law. 
The assurance that it does so is safeguarded by 
the right of review by this court. 
"Due to the responsibility imposed upon the 
Commission, and its presumed knowledge and 
expertise in this field, its findings and order are 
supported by certain well-recognized rules of re-
view. They are endowed with a presumption of 
validity and correctness; and the burden is upon 
the pl~intiff to show that they are in error. We 
survey the evidence in the light most favorable 
to sustaining them; and we will not reverse unless 
there is no reasonable basis therein to support 
them so that it appears that the Commission's 
action was capricious and arbitrary." 
The above stated quotation is not an isolated 
expression of this Court on the function of the Com-
mission. By statute, Section 54-7-16, and by judicial 
interpretation the presumption of validity of the pro-
ceedings is strong. The burden of persuasion is clear 
on the appellants (plaintiffs) to show from the record 
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that the action of the Commission was arbitrary a
11 
c 
capricious, or that it has exceeded its jurisdiction. 
a 
POINT VI a 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING m a 
INTERIM ORDER CANCELLING THE or n 
TRATING AUTHORITY. 
Without detailing the several other bases of tn 
grounds for reconsideration, may we summarize sue 
in this sentence. 'Vycoff Company's certificate is bein1 " 
revoked erroneously because the appellant-protestanl· 
failed to procure a transcript of testimony for tliei 
appeal. 11 
The obvious injustice of setting aside a bona M 0 
order of the Commission, without a review of the er1 11 
dence by this Court, should be apparent. A parallt s 
circumstance would be for this Court, on an appeal frou 
a District Court decision in a law case to reverse ani I: 
set aside a judgment for the plaintiff on the grouna, a 
that the appellant had failed to supply a transcript o 11 
the trial to the Clerk of Court for certification or l 
appeal. 11 
The action of this Court is akin to declaring tba r 
a trial judge may not make any decision, even afte: \ 
hearing the case without a jury, hearing the argument ii 
of counsel and receiving post-trial memoranda froc c 
both sides, because he failed to have a transcript r e 
testimony prepared before rendering judgment. T~ 3 
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examiner selected and designated by the Commission 
for hearing applicatons sits in the same basic position 
as a trial judge. He is a lawyer trained in the evalu-
ation of evidence and empowered by the Legislature 
to make findings, conclusions and decisions, the same 
as any individual Commissioner. That the Commission 
must ratify and adopt such and file the same before 
they become binding on the parties does not change 
the efficacy of the administrative process. 
Frequent decisions of this Court have averred to 
"The time-honored precedent of requiring survey of 
the evidence in the light favorable to the findings of 
the trial court and of indulging credit to his determi-
nation." The same precedent respect and presumption 
of correctness applies with even more force to those 
made by the Commission, because such is fortified by a 
statutory directive. 
The growth and development of administrative 
law in the past 50 years has been essential to the efficient 
and equitable applictaion of regulatory statutes. Com-
missions, such as our Public Service Commission of 
Utah, are frequently manned by laymen not trained 
in the law. Their quasi-judicial functions are fully 
recognized as being part of the due process requirement. 
When, under proper statutory authorization, the serv-
ices of a legally trained attorney are engaged in the 
capacity of a hearing examiner to attend and take 
evidence on applications, such should be encouraged 
and not be destroyed by a decision such as this. 
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May we urge the Court to honor and respect th. 
statutory law, as well as the prior decisions of this Cour1 ti 
The pertinent factors which would appear to sustair
1 
bi 
the certificate of the Commission against this untimeh ei 
interim revocation are·. · ci 
ill 
Section 54-1-6 U.C.A. 1953 
authorizing appointment of an examiner anJ C 
his powers adopted by the Commission; bi 
Section 54-7-10 
the orders are effective 20 days after service 
Section 54-7-16 
findings and conclusions on questions of fac'. 
not subject to review. 
That the issue of the authority of the examiner si 
to act is a completely new development will be observed b· 
from reading the points in the appellant-protestanh tc 
briefs. Not one asserted that he had no authority tu tl 
hear and render a decision to the Court. All partie! p: 
had wholeheartedly accepted and participated in tht n 
hearings without objection. ti 
The nearest any of the appellant-protestants cami 
tc 
to this issue was Point III in the Milne et al brief. 
which complained that an absence of a transcript (whicl ti 
they should have provided) "denies the plaintiffs o: 12 
their lawful rights to a decision by the Commission am b 
to a review by this Court of the Commission's order si 
The discussion of this point was directed to the pron r: 
sions of Section 54-7-10 relating to the need of a trafr tl 
script before this Court for review. s1 
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The Court may recall that nothing was said about 
the role and functions of the examiner in the \Vycoff 
brief because it had not been raised on appeal. How-
erer, counsel for \Vycoff did, in the oral argument, 
cite that Section 54-1-6 U.C.A. 1953 to the Court to 
ilt1tline more fully the background and to remind the 
Court that both the examiner and the Commission had 
before them the memoranda of all parties prior to the 
rrndition of their respective decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
\Ve would most strongly urge the Court to recon-
r sider its decision which has set aside the certificate issued 
by the Commission in this case. It would appear proper 
1 to hold the case before the Court for continuation of 
u the appeal without prejudice to the positions of any 
! party. A mandate should go out directing the prepa-
e ration and filing of the transcript in accordance with 
the established custom and granting a reasonable time 
to accomplish such. 
The failure of this Court to rectify the impact of 
this interim decision will be tragic for all administrative 
1i law in Utah. The usefulness of a statutory examiner 
r by an administrative body will be nullified. The pos-
sibility for a single Commissioner to hear applications, 
1 rate matters, etc., will be negatived also. The work of 
r the reporter will be doubled if he must prepare a tran-
script of every case. The Commissioners are too heavily 
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burdened with other duties and statutory responsiM. 
ties to attend en masse all hearings and their qua1, 
judicial functions will be crippled. 
We cannot possibly over-emphasize the unfortu. 
nate impact of this decision on the Commission. S1 
too on Wycoff Company its certificate will be stayen 
and revoked without the filing of a bond or the givini 
of any protection to it or the public, nor a showin1 
of arbitrary or capricious action by the Commission 
The Commission's decision is prima facie valii 
and binding. The Court says it cannot review it as lni 
record is not complete, so obviously it should not attemp: 
to affirm or to revoke that decision of the Commission 
in whole or in part, without a complete record. Commo~ 
justice dictates the continuance of the Commission' 
order, made in pursuance of statutory authority, un\i 
review of the complete record has been had. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HARRY D. PUGSLEY 
ZAR E. HAYES 
400 El Paso Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Wycoff Company 
Incorporated 
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